MORE often than not views on the value of Nato membership fall into two opposing camps.

On one side there are those who view the alliance as a bulwark against tyranny and authoritarianism that has helped keep the peace in Europe for 75 years after the continent’s centuries of war.

On the other side are those who argue that its existence only makes the world a more dangerous place and Nato’s “expansion” eastwards helped bring about Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Amidst the rancour generated by these two opposing views, the one certainty is that as the alliance’s leaders gather in Washington this week, Nato has rarely faced a more challenging time since its formation.

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These challenges are both external and internal. As Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on, China, Iran and North Korea continue to provide support to Moscow drawing the autocratic governments of these four countries ever closer.

In short, the threats Nato faces in Europe and Asia are now inextricably linked, making for a potential reshaping of the geopolitical and security landscape not seen in decades.

Troubling as this is for Nato leaders, there is then the question of the alliance’s internal wrangling.

This is compounded by the prospect of a US presidential election in November that could well see Donald Trump back heading up the alliance’s most powerful member – the US. Leaders of Nato’s European members will be acutely aware of what happened the last time Trump was in the White House.

But if Trump was right about one thing when last in office, it was that Nato’s members needed to up their financial commitment to meet that figure of 2% of GDP on defence, before bolstering it to 2.5%.

Now, as Keir Starmer makes his first international trip since winning power, he will be under pressure to confirm a timetable for the UK to boost defence spending to meet that figure.

It’s all very well for Starmer to give assurances of Britain’s “cast-iron” commitment to Nato, but as every political leader knows, saying things and making them happen are often two very different things.

I mentioned earlier that more often than not there are two conflicting takes on the value of Nato membership. Personally, I fall into the former, believing as I do that in our increasingly dangerous world the need for such an alliance is paramount.

Those who argue that the very presence of Nato itself only adds to that danger are entitled to such view, but I’m forever curious as to what they would suggest as an alternative security apparatus when confronted by the ambitions of the likes of Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un.

Though China is often presented as part of that threat to Nato, it’s curious that when Putin had a recent get-together with Kim last month to sign a mutual defence assistance deal, even Beijing was said to be rather twitchy. China’s fear is that the North Korean leader will be less beholden to them and might become even more of a loose cannon in an already tense region.

My point here is that such is the dangerous state of flux in which the global geopolitical and security landscape finds itself that it would be folly to think that by turning our back on Nato that somehow clear and present threats would simply disappear.

It’s precisely that kind of naive thinking that autocrats and dictators sit in readiness to exploit whenever they can.

This is not to say that Nato is some kind of knight in shining armour ready to stand fast for all its members, even if Article 5 of the alliance pact calls for whatever means necessary to assist an ally.

As any thinking person knows, politics are full of double standards and geopolitics and security are no different.

Sometimes though rather than just chucking arms at a situation as is the case in Ukraine, it’s equally important never to lose sight of diplomatic or other alternatives to bring pressure on Putin’s regime.

A case in point was a report yesterday in the Financial Times that revealed how the type of Russian cruise missile that destroyed a Kyiv children’s hospital this week relied on Western-designed components that the Kremlin has managed to procure by evading Western sanctions.

While sanctions have cut off Russia from some advanced components like those needed for its KH-101 missiles, the Kremlin is able to buy these microprocessors and other parts made primarily for civilian use on the open market and import them via China.

In other words, while Nato continues to provide Ukraine with more weaponry to defend itself, a lot more could still be done here in the West to plug such loopholes and prevent Russia bypassing sanctions.

While it would be naive to imagine that closing down such gaps would totally disable Russia’s missile attacks, surely such approaches should be exhausted before always resorting to more arms, or at least work in tandem.

But going back to Nato, how interesting it is that just ahead of this week’s 75th annual summit a major multi-country survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) made for some curious findings.

It showed that there was sustained public support for the delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine but also divisions on how the war will end – and the purpose of European aid.

It showed too that Nato leaders are unlikely to find domestic backing for troop deployments or increases in defence spending to assist the war effort with 66% of people in the UK opposed to the idea of sending troops to fight in Ukraine.

Some 36% also reject the proposition that defence spending should be “increased” at the expense of key areas, like health, education, and crime prevention.

This stands in contrast to the survey’s finding that almost two and half years into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a majority of Ukrainians 58%, believe they can secure a battlefield victory, and that confidence in Ukraine’s armed forces and the country’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, remains high.

Put in a nutshell – as the report’s authors conclude – this means that “looming divergences of opinion between European and Ukrainian publics could make finding agreement on how the war should end extremely challenging and have significant impacts on Kyiv’s pathway to Nato and EU accession.”

And so it’s against this backdrop that Mr Starmer goes to Washington and finds himself in at the deep end. Oh to be a fly on the wall in some of those closed meetings in the US capital this week.