ONE of the key debating points between the Yes and the No campaigns in the run-up to the 2014 independence referendum was what independence would mean for Scotland’s membership of the European Union. The Yes side suggested that, as the country was already fully compliant with the requirements of EU law, an independent Scotland would be able to become a member in its own right from the day it left the UK.

The No side, in contrast, argued that, in the event of Scottish independence, the rest of the UK would be the “­continuing state” and consequently would alone ­retain the rights and memberships of the current UK state. An independent ­Scotland would have to apply anew for EU membership, accept that the success of its application could not be ­guaranteed and that it would, inter alia, have to ­commit to joining the Euro.

The arguments were pursued with ­passion by both sides. It was, after all, ­important to any evaluation of the costs and benefits of independence, albeit the issue was overtaken when less than two years later the UK voted narrowly to leave the EU.

However, it was an irrelevance so far as how voters’ choice of Yes or No was ­concerned. For in the event, how ­people voted was largely unrelated to their ­attitudes towards the EU.

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This became clear when the 2015 ­Scottish Social Attitudes survey ­compared the choices made by “Eurosceptics” and “Europhiles”. The former were those who either felt Britain should leave the EU or that the EU should have fewer powers, while the latter either backed the current relationship between the UK and the EU or said the EU should become more powerful.

Despite the SNP’s long-held vision of “Independence in Europe”, Eurosceptics (49%) were in fact a little more likely than Europhiles (44%) to say they had voted Yes to independence.

We should not, of course, be surprised. After all, the SNP’s stance on the EU only dated from Jim Sillars’s time as the ­party’s depute leader in the early 1990s. In the 1975 referendum, the party had campaigned against the UK remaining a part of the then common market. ­Meanwhile, some nationalists argued that there was little point liberating Scotland from the dead hand of London, only to tie itself in chains to Brussels.

The pattern of voting in the 2016 ­referendum on the UK’s EU ­membership confirmed the weakness of the link ­between people’s attitudes towards ­independence and their views about the EU.

According to the 2015-24 British ­Election Study internet panel, while 62% of those who had voted Yes in 2014 backed Remain in the Brexit contest, so also did 60% of those who had supported No. The two issues of Brexit and independence were largely separate in people’s minds.

However, the outcome of the EU ­referendum began to forge a link between the two. Much as nationalists had anticipated, some of those who had voted No in 2014 and Remain in 2016 began to switch to Yes as a result of their disappointment with the decision to leave the EU. At the same time, now that the UK was heading for the EU exit door, some who had voted Yes in 2014 and Leave in 2016 changed their minds about leaving the UK.

For a while at least, the two movements largely cancelled each other, leaving the overall level of support for independence in the polls little different from the 45% registered in the 2014 ballot.

However, it did mean that those who ­opposed Brexit were increasingly ­inclined to favour independence, while its ­supporters were more likely to be found in the No camp. By 2019, the Scottish ­Social Attitudes survey was reporting that 65% of those who said they would vote to ­Remain in the EU in a second referendum were also saying they would vote Yes to independence, compared with just 43% of those who would vote to Leave the EU.

By this stage, support for independence as registered in the polls also began to see an uplift. On average in 2019, as many as 49% said that they would vote Yes, up from 45% the previous year. Given that around twice as many people voted No and Remain as had backed Yes and Leave, the swing among the former group towards Yes was always likely eventually to more than counterbalance the swing to No among the latter group.

So, the UK’s decision to leave the EU changed the character of support for ­independence. That continues to be the case. In the most recent Scottish Social Attitudes survey, conducted in the ­autumn of 2023, as many as 59% of those who would vote to rejoin the EU said they would now vote Yes, compared with just 20% of those who would vote to stay out.

Meanwhile, despite the reduced ­electoral popularity of the SNP since Nicola Sturgeon’s resignation, polls ­conducted ­during the 2024 General Election ­campaign ­suggested that Scotland ­continues to be more or less evenly divided on the ­constitutional question, with 48% saying on average that they would now vote Yes.

(Image: PA)

That said, some of the economic doubts that dissuaded voters from backing Yes in 2014 are still present.

In September 2021 Opinium repeated a question it had previously fielded shortly before the 2014 ballot that asked respondents whether they thought independence would benefit or damage the economy. Rather more (40%) said they thought it would damage the economy than believed it would bring benefit (35%), a not dissimilar picture to 2014 when the equivalent figures were 45% and 37% respectively.

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Equally, in 2020, YouGov repeated a question on the economics of independence it had asked during the referendum campaign. It found that 42% reckoned Scotland would be worse off if it were ­independent from the rest of the UK, while 34% believed it would be worse off – figures that again were little different from those recorded shortly before the 2014 ballot of 45% and 37% respectively.

However, while many voters may still have doubts about the consequences of leaving the UK, even more, are sceptical about what Brexit is going to bring.

For example, the 2019 Scottish Social Attitudes survey found that while one in three (33%) thought independence would make Scotland’s economy worse, three in five (61%) said that leaving the EU would result in the country’s economy ­being worse off.

At the same time, just 21% ­believed that independence would ­weaken Scotland’s voice in the world whereas half (50%) believed Brexit would weaken Britain’s voice in world affairs.

These perceptions of Brexit matter. The choice that would now be put to voters in any future independence referendum is not the simple binary choice between b­eing inside or outside the UK with which they were presented in 2014. Rather, they would be asked to choose between ­being inside the UK but outside the EU, or ­being inside the EU but outside the UK.

This choice would involve trade-offs and implications that were not considered in 2014.

For example, voters would have to ­decide whether Scotland would be better off within the relatively small but more highly integrated UK single market, or in the much larger but at present less highly co-ordinated EU market.

Scotland has yet to have this debate – arguably one of the biggest failures of the SNP since the pandemic has been their ­inability to bring the issue to the ­forefront of political debate. But research undertaken last year via ScotCen’s random probability survey suggests independence looks more attractive to voters when it is presented as a choice between being in the UK or the EU, rather than simply a question of being in or out of the UK.

For example, just 25% said that Scotland’s economy would be stronger as part of the UK but outside the EU, compared with 46% who reckoned it would be stronger as part of the EU, but outside the UK. Similarly, only 18% believed Scotland would have a stronger voice in the world as part of the UK but not a member of the EU, while 47% reckoned its voice would be stronger inside the EU but outside the UK. Meanwhile, although 31% believed that being outside the UK represented the bigger risk, even more – 39% – reckoned being outside the EU was the riskier option.

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That said, we should note that many Scots do not as yet have a clear view about this choice. Around one in four (23%) believe that whichever option was chosen would not make much difference either way to the economy. One in three (33%) say the same of the impact on Scotland’s voice in the world, while 27% feel the risk would be much the same either way.

Crucially, those who hold this view are inclined to stick with the status quo. Only 28% of those who believe it would make little difference to Scotland’s voice in the world currently say they would vote Yes. Equally, only 39% of those who are agnostic on the economic implications would back Yes.

Brexit may have strengthened the case for independence in some voters’ eyes, but if the 2014 decision is ever to be ­overturned, more would need to be ­positively convinced of the relative ­merits of EU membership as opposed to ­remaining part of the UK.

This essay is an excerpt from The National's indyref anniversary book, 10 Years of A Changed Scotland. You can order it here.